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For-Giving Death: Cixous's Osnabrück and Le Jour où je n'étais pas là
Abstract
In her early writings, Hélène Cixous earned recognition as the feminist proponent of a theory of gift
economy that challenges the patriarchal practice of giving. Patriarchal giving, she contended, enacts the
master-slave dialectic, maintaining power differentials by indemnifying and reducing the other to the one
who gives. Cixous imagined an alternate practice whereby the gift incurs no debts and no death for the
other, a giving without expectation of return, a generosity that enriches all who participate. More than two
decades after those theoretical essays, Cixous continues to explore in her fiction the relationship to the
other as mediated by gifts; however, her earlier concept of giving has been considerably modified, as a
reading of two very recent novels will show. In Osnabrück, an otherwise admirable model of generosity is
put in question for ignoring the debts and death that dog even the most generous relationships with the
other. Extending this understanding, Le Jour où je n'étais pas là presents death and debt as nonnegotiable givens and obliges us to conceive of a kind of generosity predicated simultaneously on death
and on the forgetting of death.
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lei
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"My mother will feed me to the grave" the writer-narrator of
Helene Cixous's Osnabruck good-humoredly says, evoking an extraordinary, if excessive, maternal generosity. The narrator leaves
little room to doubt Mother Eve's proclivity for enthusiastic nourishing of her own; her giving nature is regularly manifested in
offerings of string beans and chicken, mussels and celery root,
pans of milk, plates of fish, strawberries, carrots, and cabbage.
But beyond these motherly behaviors, Eve is a powerful, "unsinkable," and life-driving force whose example, as the quote also intimates, will feed the narrator's writing for a lifetime. Given
Cixous's characterization of this maternal figure, it is difficult
not to draw parallels between the ever-giving Eve and the prototype of feminine generosity described in "Laugh of the Medusa":
She doesn't "know" what she's giving, she doesn't measure it; she

gives, though, neither a counterfeit impression nor something
she hasn't got. She gives more, with no assurance that she'll get
back even some unexpected profit from what she puts out. She
gives that there may be life, thought, transformation. (893)
As readers of Cixous's early and seminal essays will recall,

her theory of "feminine" generosity was put forth as an alternative to the practice of giving in a patriarchal economy.' Disinterested giving, she contends in "Castration and Decapitation," is
never practiced under the auspices of patriarchy:
Published by New Prairie Press
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Everything must return to the masculine. "Return": the economy
is founded on a system of returns. If a man spends and is spent,
it's on condition that his power returns. If a man should go out
to the other, it's always done according to the Hegelian model,
the model of the master-slave dialectic. (50)

In such an exchange, the giver asserts and consolidates power by
binding others to himself and vitiating the power of others to his
own advantage. A gift always implies debt and deficiency for the
recipient. As Alan Schrift points out in a recent comparative analysis of Nietzsche and Cixous, debt and guilt are conceptually linked
and even linguistically linked in German (Schuld = debt; schuldig
= guilty), connotations particularly transparent for Cixous, whose
mother tongue is German? A gift to another bestows social obligation, personal deficit, and even moral shortfall. We might take
cross-linguistic associations a step further, as did Marcel Mauss
in his classic anthropological study of the gift: "Gift" is "poison"
in German, and reminds us of the lethal nature of giving.' As
the patriarchal economy degenerates into a struggle
to keep debt, guilt, and even death on the other's side. In clear
opposition, "Laugh" spurns death and diminishment, touts the
"exchange that multiplies" and opens uncounted spaces for others to occupy "between the other me where one is always infinitely more than one and more than me" (263, 264). The essay
projects nothing less than exponential gains to be had all around
in this alternate economy.
To suggest that Cixous has merely reified her earlier theoretical projections in the maternal character of Eve, however, is to
slight the complexity of her writing and to miss the refinements
to her thought over the last twenty-five years. Most certainly,
Cixous still finds relationships to the other a continued focus of
her thought-and one can hear echoes of the alternate economy
in her description in a mid-nineties interview of the rapports of
reciprocity with the other:
The other in all his or her forms gives me I. It is on the occasion
of the other that I catch sight of me; or that I catch me at: reacting,
choosing, refusing, accepting. It is the other who makes my portrait. . . The other of all sorts is also of all diverse richness. The
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol28/iss2/7
more the other is rich, the more I am rich. (Rootprints 13)4
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Still, Cixous moves away perceptibly from the untempered optimism of the seventies. She returns to the vexing questions: how
does one acknowledge otherness and accept it as the rich, diverse
gift it can be without appropriating and diminishing the other,
without inadvertently causing the other's death? Can there possibly be an exchange that respects otherness? Or is the other's
death-or one's own-always implied in the gift? The observation about mother's liberality leading up to the tomb is, in this
perspective, only half facetious.
At least some of the terrain of Cixous's more recent reflections on giving to others has been prepared by Jacques Derrida,
about whom Cixous has said, "I have infinite thinking freedom
with [him]" (Rootprints 80). One particular essay of his, "The Time
of the King," discusses the gift in a way that sharpens the problems
and defines the ambiguities that interest Cixous. Derrida reasons, "for there to be a gift, there must be no reciprocity, return,
exchange, countergift, or debt. If the other gives me back or owes
me or has to give me back what I give him or her, there will not
have been a gift" (128). In the event of a gift, the recipient cannot
even go so far as to "recognize the gift as gift," (129) lest s/he put in
motion the whole dynamic of returns. Derrida sums up by saying: "if there is no gift, there is no gift, but if there is gift held or
beheld as gift by the other, once again there is no gift" (130). The
only condition under which a real gift exchanged equitably and
disinterestedly between others could be made is if there were an
absolute forgetting of the gift, not a repression as the author cautions, but "a forgetting that also absolves, that unbinds absolutely
and infinitely more, therefore, than excuse, forgiveness, or acquittal" (132). Having posited the gift on its own forgetting, Derrida
situates true giving virtually outside the limits of experience and
knowledge. For the purposes of my essay, I am isolating this definition from the philosopher's development of arguments that allow him to extrapolate from the theory of the gift the relation
between thinking and knowing.
Somewhere short of these absolute, philosophical terms,
Cixous re-thinks and re-writes the nature of generous exchange
with the other. Two recent fictions, Osnabruck (1999) and Le Jour
Published by New Prairie Press
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je n'etais pas la (The Day I Wasn't T(her)e) (2000) ponder the
dilemmas of gifts and debts to others. A back-to-back reading of
the two narratives makes salient some interesting modifications
to Cixous's thought on the nature of giving. In Osnabruck, an
otherwise admirable model of generosity is put in question for
ignoring the debts and death that dog even the most generous
relationships with the other. Extending this understanding, Le Jour
presents death and debt as non-negotiable givens and obliges us
to conceive of a kind of generosity predicated simultaneously on
death'and on the forgetting of death. As I hope to demonstrate,
Cixous eventually suggests that the relation with the other is better sustained in acts of forgiving than in acts of giving.
Osnabruck amplifies the image, frequently but briefly
glimpsed in other fictions, of the generous woman, personified
in the book as the narrator-writer's mother, Eve. Eve appears as
the benevolent kitchen crone, remarkable for her irrepressible
liberality and her life-sustaining drive. She deploys abundance as
easily and almost as effortlessly as she takes breath. Even beyond
the home, the mother displays generosity without calculation or
judgment: "Elle ne pense pas, ne calcule pas. Donne la vie sans
intention de dormer" 'She doesn't think, doesn't calculate. Gives
life without intending to give' (0 63). Like the archetypal woman
of "Laugh," she gives without transfer of loss, without diminishment. Broadly outlined, one of the problems that the narrator of
the book faces is how to respond in kind to the mother's example,
how to write about this best-loved other with the same generous
acceptance she has modeled.
Certainly Eve's "bonte flottante" 'floating goodness' suggests
the openness and open-handedness toward others that Cixous
dreams of elsewhere; Eve is "sans charity, sans compassion sans
pitie, elle ne s'identifie a personne" 'without charity, without compassion without pity, she identifies herself with no one' (0 63). At
the same time that Eve feels unbound to others, she refuses to
pass judgment on or find fault with others. This German Jewish
immigrant living in French Algeria asserts that she accepts what
she finds. When, for example, Eve catches her housekeeper pilfering money, she decides against speaking out ("je n'ai rien dit"
of4
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said nothing' [0 113] ), let alone blaming the woman. Eve's
generosity extends to a moratorium on guilt or failing or debt.
On principle, she eschews the economy of give-and-take, of obligations accrued and discharged, of circulating debt. Even her modest self-judgment-in a passage named "the confession of my
mother"-corroborates a practice of non-competition. Eve states
simply that she has neither stolen nor coveted nor been afflicted
with the ambition to "crush others" (0 105). Her concept of relationship with others is all of a piece: she refrains from entering
into the unequal bonds with others of obligation, of domination,.
or of subservience.
As ideal as all of this may sound, Cixous's text introduces
thoughtful critique of the mother's apparently irreproachable
position. If Eve refuses to acknowledge debt, she also refuses any
articulations of difference as well. Being oblivious to difference
endangers the sovereign status of the other as surely as does harnessing others in inequitable relationships. Cixous demonstrates
this reverse side to Eve's unselfconscious giving and her boundless availability in any of a number of domestic events between
the narrator and her mother. For example, the narrator describes
with gentle humor Eve's unannounced insinuations into her (the
narrator's) apartment to make meals or do housework. The writer
requests unsuccessfully that the mother ring the doorbell to announce her arrival so as to be welcomed "de l'autre cote du monde"
`from the other side of the world' and thus acknowledged and
celebrated as other ("tu serais reconnue, to reconnaitrais" 'you
would be recognized, would recognize' [0 83]). The mother's
obstinate refusal to distinguish her presence, to confirm her otherness from her daughter is consistent with Eve's denial of any
(other) affiliations and thus any recognition of others' status. (She
fails to identify herself with other Jews, other Germans, other
women, other widows, etc.) Taken to its extreme, the inability to
recognize or assert differences becomes a failure to relate to the
other as not the same-or even to relate the other.5 Serious consequences ensue for the writer, beginning with herself. She says of
her mother that Eve neither congratulated nor scolded her for her
behavior, a characteristic abstention on Eve's part, but that leads
`I
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the narrator to the following conclusion: "ma maman ne me conte
pas" 'my mother doesn't narrate me' (0 170). Eve's model of generosity disassociates itself from the possibility of a kind of writing
that discerns and distinguishes the other. The narrator can truly
say "entre elle et ecrire it y a incompatibilite" 'between her and
writing there is incompatibility' (0 48) if by writing she means
the attempt to think a relationship that simultaneously takes nothing from the other and also recognizes the other. Giving the gift
without return that Eve has perfected is somewhat compromised
by her inability to acknowledge some essential, inappropriable
non-sameness. In this respect, Eve's otherwise remarkable example doesn't fully analogize the generosity, the generous thinking, and the generous writing that Cixous seeks.
Perhaps the clearest rift between the mother and the writer
(not to mention between early "theory" and subsequent "praxis")
is on the issue of (the other's) death. "Laugh" boldly lays out a
position: "wherever history still unfolds as the history of death,
she [the generous woman] does not tread" (893). I interpret
Cixous to mean that real giving founds itself in a refusal to participate in the history of the survival of a few at the expense of
many. Certainly in her relentless campaign to sustain-life wherever she sees it Eve seems to adhere to this principle. In some
highly symbolic ways, Eve turns the family history away from one
of endless loss to one of uncountable gains. When obliged to
earn the family's livelihood, Eve transforms her deceased husband's
TB clinic for the dying into a maternity clinic whose sole raison
d'être is to bring humans into the world. She studiously ignores
death both professionally and personally, despite being herself
immersed in a history of untimely and unjust deaths: her father's,
her husband's, her grandson's, her friends and relatives lost in the
Holocaust. Says the narrator: "Selon elle cela ne sert a rien de
parler mort apres la mort" 'according to her there's no point in
speaking of death after death' (0 55). But in not acknowledging
death, Eve doesn't manage to avoid participation in a history of
death. Quite to the contrary, she seems to become complicit in
that history when, for example, she survives the Algerian conflict
by paying no notice to widespread and horrific death caused by

https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol28/iss2/7
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violent clashes of difference. On a literal level, indifference to the
other's death translates into a worrisome negligence of the plight
of others. On a symbolic level, indifference to death dissolves all
remaining trace of the other and otherness and obviates any possibility of relation-relation with the other being, of course, the
ultimate purpose of the generous gift. The question for the writer
must be how excluding death or its histories can ever entirely
acknowledge (that is, maintain an appropriate relation with) others.

Osnabruck poses the question inversely as well. Can there be
generous writing, a writing that recognizes and celebrates the
other and gives her sacred space without incurring some debt,
indeed, without incurring some death? Even the narrator's attempts to write about her generous generatrix get snarled in this
dilemma. The narrator has chosen the mother as the subject of
her writing precisely because she feels keenly that Eve has long
been the most beloved other to whom she has been the least generous and whose otherness she has least honored in writing. But
writing about mother risks the same fatal consequences as not
writing about her:
a

Mais ne pas ecrire maman
c'est tuer maman dans l'oeuf, c'est
la cacher sous le lit de papa sous la tombe, ecrire sur elle c'est
mais ne pas ecrire
marcher sur son corps pendant qu'elle dort
sur elle c'est l'oublier expres sous une feuille de papier.

But not to write mama
is to kill mama in the womb, to hide
her under papa's bed under his tombstone, to write on her is to
but not to write on her is to
walk over her body as she sleeps
forget her on purpose under a sheet of paper. (0 161)
.

.

.

.

.

.

The narrator can't choose to give no death (or to owe no debt).
Her writing can't be generous in the way her mother seems to be
generous, diiregarding finality and seeing only continuity.
Writing in a way that recognizes the other, recognizes the
other's differences, recognizes the other's fragile presence is a conscious gift to the other-and like all conscious gifts presented to
the other, some cost is inevitably involved, some form of death
inevitably implied. Cixous acknowledges this trade-off when, in
Published by New Prairie Press
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the book, her narrator imagines repeatedly and anxiously Eve's
absences from the writer, Eve's remoteness, real and projected,
her defined and untouchable otherness even from the other (her
daughter) to whom she is most intimately connected. Armed with
the certitude that her own generosity will have deadly effects, the
narrator attempts to defer the gifts she feels she owes her mother.
In the end, she offers her mother a virtual gift: the promise of a
trip to Eve's birthplace, Osnabruck, where "ses morts s'appretaient
a venir a notre rencontre" `her dead and her deaths prepared to
meet us' (0 230). As to her writing, the narrator claims to postpone writing the book about Eve, as though to discount Osnabrack's
status as a gift that has already incurred some deadly debts. But if
Osnabruck brings home poignantly the Derridean premise that
"if there is a gift, there is no gift," it also lays the new groundwork
of Le Jour of4 je n'etais pas la in which exchanges take place and
deadly gifts already given are forgiven.
Le Jour, published less than a year after Osnabruck, takes another look at the mother's generosity. The book hovers around
questions of giving (away), giving back, and taking (away), and in
so doing returns to the term faute or "fault," accurately translatable as both responsibility and failing, a more subtle version of
debt. The "story" goes briefly like this: some forty years after the
fact, the narrator "remembers" how she gave her baby boy, a Down's
syndrome child with a serious heart condition, to her mother for
adoption. The book follows the narrator's attempts to get back
from her mother the story of the child and particularly of his
premature death in her absence and in the custody of the mother.
Even so brief a summary should raise the questions of who "owes"
whom and who might have been at fault. Guilt certainly seems to
frame the narrator's ambivalent search for her son's story: an imagined opening scene has the narrator furtively burying the "souvenir d'une faute" 'memory of a fault' (J 9). But as close as the
narrator seems to be to an admission of guilt, she ends this preface by disclaiming personal responsibility, saying of this fault,
"ce n'est pas la mienne" 'it's not mine' (J 9). This declaration
combined with the ambiguous gesture of obviously burying a
memory opens up several lines of inquiry in the narrative: what

https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol28/iss2/7
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is the fault? whose fault is it? and has the fault really been forgot-

ten?
Cixous's text plays with this concept of "fautif" by etymological association with "clefaut," defect or imperfection. From early

on, an abandoned three-legged dog wanders in and out of the
narrative. Its imperfections, like some serious crime, make it
susceptible to abandonment and destruction (indeed, the mother
asserts forcefully: "il faut l'abbbbattre" 'it should be kkkkilled' [j
24]). But the narrator also recognizes that its defects make the
dog all the more canine, as though its very lacks constitute an
essence. The text openly encourages analogies between the imperfect dog and the "imperfect" child, Georges. His lagging development, unfinished heart, and condensed lifespan highlight the
frailties associated with the human condition, as though he were
more essentially human. The narrator takes this one step further:
if the child represents some universal aspect of his species by his
incompleteness, he simultaneously represents otherness from his
species. He has other-racial characteristics in the bosom of a family whose station in life, by genetic and cultural heritage, is that of
the officially sanctioned other. He is both related to and isolated
from them. His perfect otherness is further reflected in his relationships with others. By the grandmother's testimony, the child
makes no demands on others and yet is "attachant" for all those
who come in contact with him. The child's wordless practice of
otherness suggests a perfect innocence, a complete lack of meanness or harm to all others, indeed, a totally engaging love of all
others rather than a culpable failure. Presumably for this reason
the narrator calls the child "le heros de la famille" 'the hero of the
family, her "saint simple" 'simple saint' and "l'instructeur de ma
foi" 'the instructor of my faith' (). 65). Georges combines radical
otherness with the radical practice of generosity that Cixous would
wish to embrace.
Were the child's "defauts" the only faults in the book, one
could argue that Cixous has staged a return to the optimism of
"Laugh": an idealized conception of otherness founded upon the
inevitable lacks that make each of us uniquely other combined
with an idealized conception of unmeasured and cost-free genPublished by New Prairie Press
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erosity among others. As much as this appears to be at the heart of
the book (even at the heart of some secular faith whose principles,
modeled by little Georges, can be practiced), other "fautes" occupy the author's writing. The child's generosity is not so much at
issue as is the grandmother's, and for once there appears to be a
distinct lack of generosity on her part. First, there is Eve's failure
to give (back) the story of Georges and his final moments-something that seems vaguely to be owed to the narrator. Second (and
related to the withholding of Georges's story), there is Eve's failure to give the baby life-saving medicine, which has fatal consequences. All-giving Eve appears to be doubly at fault if not downright guilty.
As Cixous arranges the narrative, Eve does confess a fault and
its attendant guilt, although the guilt on first encounter seems
oddly displaced. She reports to her daughter on several occasions
of her remorse over her mother's (Omi) death decades after
Georges's short life and rapid demise. In unprompted testimony,
Eve dwells on Omi's long and painful ordeal with death. She recalls repeatedly that Omi instructed her to give her death when it
seemed time: "Donne-moi quelque chose et ne me le dis pas"
`Give me something and don't tell me' (J 78). However, Eve fails
to administer this last gift of death for fear that it might be motivated by the desire to relieve herself of the burden of her mother's
cumbersome existence. In short, she fears the gift that is given for
what it can return to the giver. Paradoxically, though motivated
out of profound respect and love for the other, Eve does nothing
to stop Omi's final suffering. By withholding "quelque chose" (the
poisonous gift), Eve ultimately does irreparable harm, is no longer
innocent, has, by failure to give, committed a faute against her
most beloved other.
By this reasoning, the mother's conduct around Georges's
death some decades earlier avoided that failure. Eve doesn't impose herself, her will, or her gift (medicine, in this case). Her
explicit non-gift to Georges nevertheless has the virtue of being a
gift-for the baby dies peacefully within hours of Eve's decision
and is thus spared the slow and certain deterioration dictated by
his malformed heart. The narrator understands this gesture as

https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol28/iss2/7
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being as much about life as about death: "Ce qu'elle n'a jamais dit
concernant la mort de Georges et la mort d'Omi, ou plutot ce
qu'elle a toujours dissimule d'une mort par l'autre, ou plutOt
concernant la vie dans la mort" 'What she never said concerning
George's death and Omi's death, or rather what she always concealed of one death by the other, or rather concerning life in death'
(J 175). If Eve has buried the memory of Georges's death beneath
that of Omi's, it doesn't constitute a deliberate evasion of selfincrimination of the baby's death. Rather, the story of Omi's death
explicitly reveals Eve's failure to honor life and hence to honor
otherness-something she achieves in the case of Georges. In
short, she exposes almost obsessively the one transgression otherwise concealed by her great generosity.
In the very last pages, when the narrator discovers her mother's
role in Georges's final illness, she maintains the distinction between the mother's repeated gesture to withhold from her loved
ones: in Omi's case, Eve is "l'auteur d'une lachete" 'the author of
an act of cowardice' (1 189) whereas in Georges's case, she is
"heroique" (J 175), that is, unusually unsparing of self. The mother
merits this epithet for having given up the generous gifts of the
baby-his unconditional love and undemanding lovability-to
avoid the physical pain life would eventually cost him. Equally
important to the narrator, the mother gives up, or more accurately never gives at all, the story of her heroic sacrifice-made
moreover in the daughter's stead. We can infer that Eve fails to
give the story to her daughter because it would in its turn become
a gift reinstating the cycle of debt with the daughter and thus
given for self-aggrandizement. The mother's equally heroic gesture lies in her claims in the end to have forgotten the events of
the child's death, or at least to have forgotten her critical part, her
"gift" to her grandson.
By the logic of gift economy, forgetting one's gifts leads directly to forgetting others' debts created by those gifts. From there
the span is short between forgetting others' debts and that other
kind of giving we call forgiving, the other kind of don (gift) that
we name pardon. Technically speaking, there is no gift in forgiving other than the gesture to obliterate the debt, to overlook the
Published by New Prairie Press
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shortfall, to put an end to the cycle of exchange without once
again giving. In this conception of forgiveness, not only is the
debt forgotten, but the gift that incurs the other's debt is forgotten
as well. The narrator cites and re-cites Omi's words, writing them
as though they were the book's mantra, "donne-moi quelque chose
et ne me le dis pas": let there be a gift, but let it be given unbeknownst to the receiver and unacknowledged by the giver, a generous forgiving that annuls all debts, that honors the other sans
accuser, without accusing or distinguishing either donor or recipient.
"Donne-moi" may have originally been Omi's request, but
Cixous uses it to define the subtle, tacit transactions between Eve
and her daughter as well. Eve gives her daughter stories that should
not be told, and the daughter understands that Eve does so without "wishing to wish" that they be told. One might imagine her
unspoken and indirect directive to read as follows: " 'Don't tell
me' that you have written these stories but 'give' them anyway.
without having
recourse to the dehumanizing bonds of debt. I, in turn, release
you unknowingly from the obligation to give." The narrator's writing of Eve's stories (unread, of course, by her mother) has the
potential to honor her mother's unformulated request.
What is more, the stories or "secrets" about her clinic (stories
that Eve insists she is giving her daughter-writer not to give) demonstrate Eve's practice of forgiveness:
Toutes ces femmes qui sont accusees d'enfant, de non-enfant,
d'enfant pas comme ceci pas comme cela, toutes ces coupables
qui defilent dans le parloir ou ma mere tant6t
par definition
ferme les yeux tantot ouvre les yeux et toutes nous secretons des
ruses et des silences ca tisse sans cesse de modestes petites toiles
pour tenter de camoufler les indices des crimes qu'elles n'ont pas
commis.
.

.

.

All these women accused of children, of non-children, of children
not like this or that, all these guilty by definition . who parade
through the parlor where my mother sometimes closes her eyes
sometimes opens her eyes and we all secrete ruses and silences it
incessantly weaves modest little cloths to try to disguise the evidence of crimes they haven't committed. (I 142)
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol28/iss2/7
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Eve consciously overlooks (that is, with eyes both open and

shut)
the arbitrary measures of defect and debt and the punitive remedies they imply. The unspoken and unseen purpose of her concerted inattention is to overturn judgments and strike down "death
sentences"-in short, to maneuver consciously to preserve life.
Eve offers to this assortment of falsely accused women the generous recognition of a common humanity in a momentary community-the briefly glimpsed "nous" that seems to include the
narrator and perhaps even herself among the so-called guilty. Like
the women who come to the clinic falsely accused of all manner
of failing, Georges is, in that outside "economy" of debits and
credits, measured and found wanting. Within his grandmother's
clinic, these defects become arbitrary and without significance.
Even Georges's death can be read in the context of the clinic since
his grandmother keeps him from the cruel and dehumanizing
death that awaits him over the long term. The critical elements of
an act of forgiveness become salient in these examples: the active
un-knowing of "faute" or failure and the respectful acknowledgment of humanness as opposed to the offensive fault or even the
generosity of the reprieve.
Cixous chooses to feature in the book's final moments two
gestures that very much resemble forgiveness as defined above,
that is, the conscious forgetting of debts. In the first instance the
narrator says of her dead child: "J'ouvre les mains. On ne reprend
pas l'enfant qu'on a donne" 'I open my hands. You can't take back
the child you've given away' (190). Whether debt is incurred in
the giving or taking of the child is ambiguous and immaterial.
More certainly, the narrator arrests the circle of debt in order to
restore ties to her mother and brother. In the second instance (in
fact, the book's last sentence), the writer figuratively lets close the
door of her mother's clinic in Algeria, thereby letting go the secret
stories of transgression, her own included, in order to get on with
life. Closing the book in this fashion suggests fairly clearly that
the initial question of faute has been declared moot, the memory
of faute scrupulously-in all senses of the word-buried. But
even the initial image of burial can lend connotations to Cixous's
concept of "forgiving": less a commitment to oblivion than a sign
of respect for what is human.
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In this sense, to conclude by overlooking death/debt in the
very notion of forgiveness would be to miss a critical difference
in the "pardon" that Cixous explores in this book. Although in its
archaic sense, "pardon" does mean to forfeit what is owed (and in
capital cases this means, of course, to forget the death set as the
penalty), Cixous's formula of forgiveness, "donne-moi quelque
chose et ne me le dis pas," doesn't entirely annul death. "Give me
something," "finish me off" it says "and don't tell me." Not "I will
forgive the death (yours) that you owe me" but rather "I will forgive the death (mine) that you give me." Debt and death split in
the second formulation: debt disappears; death does not. As debt
is removed, Cixous can re-balance the equation: neither party
would dominate in this giving and forgiving of death: After all,
the "giver" would also be at fault were it not for the anticipatory
amnesty that pre-empts debt and guilt. And the "recipient" of this
death, would hold the double status of being beholden and aggrieved, had she chosen to know in advance. The power of death
that remains between these two parties is meaningful not for punishment or self-aggrandizement (in other words, the reduction of
one to an other) but as an equilibrating concession to the other.
In the final analysis, we have the narrator's writing to thank
that this idiosyncratic version of forgiveness that "forgets" itself
in the act-"donne-moi quelque chose et ne me le dis pas" 'give
me something and don't tell me'-is nevertheless not entirely
forgotten. By virtue of putting the words of pre-emptive forgiveness first in Omi's mouth, then Eve's, then her own, the narrator
traces this "generous" maternal history of mutual forgiveness that
can't quite forget the "history of death." In this particular history,
Cixous redefines the gift (don) as the death-both power over the
other and failing toward the other-that stands between humans.
The pardon that she also articulates is not a gift or even an antigift but rather a recognition of that fragile life-and-death relation
between one and her other. To give more or to know more would
be to reengage in giving death. Ironically, the writer of Le Jour
can't succeed in giving or receiving a full pardon any more than
she could succeed in giving a death-less gift (her mother never
entirely recognizes what takes place between herself and her

https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol28/iss2/7
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daughter). Nevertheless the writing that Cixous freely gives to her
readers comes as close as one might dare to imagining a humanly
possible practice of generosity toward others.

Notes
1 I would like to keep in mind that Cixous eschewed an essentialist
position even in these early writings. As the author cautions more
than once, "we have to be careful not to lapse smugly or blindly into
an essentialist ideological interpretation" (NBW 81). 1 will keep the
qualifiers "masculine" and "feminine" in quotations to make appar-

ent Cixous's challenges to those over-simplified designations. "Patriarchal" names more accurately the practices to which Cixous imagines alternatives.
Schrift's essay helpfully links Nietschze's concept of a society certain
enough of its power to be able to disregard debts and Cixous's concept of a "feminine libidinal" economy in which giving is never associated with diminishment.
2

Mauss says "the danger represented by the thing given or transmitted is possibly nowhere better expressed than in very ancient Germanic languages. This explains the double meaning of the word Gift
as gift and poison" (61-62).
3

4 The "other" in academic discourse, particularly since post-colonial

studies, has been weighted with the sense of those who are disenfranchised from the dominant or colonizing culture. Cixous has often
thought in these specific terms. Les Reveries de la femme sauvage, for
example, relates the narrator's youth in French Algeria and endows
the term "other" with those precise connotations. Just as often-and
such is mostly the case in the works considered here-the Cixousian
writer refers to the other as simply the one who is not me, although
that neat distinction is undone even in the quote given here. Attridge's
statement about the other always being in relation may prove useful
here:

If the other is always and only other to me, I am already in some
kind of relation to it, and this means that it participates with me
in some general, shared framework. Otherness, that is, is produced in an active or event-like relation-we might call it a relatPublished by New Prairie Press
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ing: the other as other to is always and constitutively on the point
of turning from the unknown into the known, from the other
into the same. (22)

Kamuf offers a reading of an event that Cixous writes about and
that, for one split second, enacts a desirable encounter with the other.
Cixous describes how Franz Kafka bowed to a blind man to whom he
was being presented. The other man knew he had been thus recognized because Kafka's hair had lightly grazed his face in the course of
this show of respect. Kamuf interprets:
5

[The bow] is a general address, and the respect it signifies is a
function of this generality. It addresses the other as, in effect, the
same as all those to whom one owes respect, regardless of any
and all difference. More precisely, it acknowledges the other as
other than him- or herself, as more than or greater than a contingent, finite self, and finally, it addresses its respect to no one in
particular, but to a concept of the other as that to which respect
is owed. (82)
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